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Abstract 
Recent findings have changed how developmental psychologists understand counterfactual 
thinking, or thoughts of what might have been. Counter to claims that counterfactual thinking is a 
unitary early- or late-developing ability, recent evidence suggests it shows a protracted development 
into at least middle childhood, depends on domain-general processes including executive function and 
language, and dissociates from counterfactual emotions, such as regret. We review the developmental 
evidence which forms a critical, although often overlooked, complement to the cognitive, social and 
neuroscience literatures. Finally, we highlight future research topics, including the development of 
spontaneous counterfactual thinking and counterfactual thinking in clinical populations.  
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Much of intelligent thought involves speculating outside the here and now. Counterfactual 
thoughts compare what we know to be true with what might have been. We imagine how our lives 
would have been different had we chosen a different holiday destination, failed our high school 
exams, or accepted that invitation to dinner. As well as being of philosophical interest (e.g. Lewis, 
1975), counterfactuals are central to the practical business of learning from our past mistakes (Roese, 
2005), and support certain emotions, such as regret. Our understanding of counterfactual thinking also 
informs clinical and decision-making research (e.g. Roese, Park, Smallman, & Gibson, 2008; 
Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). There is a large and well-established body of work on counterfactual 
thinking in adults (e.g., Epstude & Roese, 2008; Mandel, Hilton, & Catellani, 2005) and a rapidly 
growing literature on the neuroscience of counterfactual emotions (e.g. Nicolle, Back, Driver, & 
Dolan, 2011). But to understand counterfactual thinking fully, we need to know how it develops.  
There are three distinct theoretical positions on counterfactual thinking development: First, it 
develops early in the preschool years (e.g. Gopnik, 2009; Byrne, 2005). Second, it appears in late 
childhood (e.g. Perner & Rafetseder, 2011). Both these positions assume that counterfactual thinking 
undergoes a single development. Based on a number of recent findings, our position is that there are 
multiple developments that culminate in adult-like counterfactual thinking. These developments are 
underpinned by specific advances in domain general processing, especially executive control 
processes that organise and control behaviour. We review these developments, outline important 
remaining questions, and reflect on the consequences for other fields. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING 
The first evidence that children think outside the here and now is when they start pretending at 
18 months (Leslie, 1987). Evidence of counterfactual thinking was first claimed by Harris, German & 
Mills (1996). Children heard a story where Carol walks across the clean floor wearing dirty shoes. 
They were asked “What if Carol had taken her shoes off – would the floor be dirty?” Three-year-olds 
gave the correct counterfactual answer (“no”) to the majority of trials. Riggs, Peterson, Robinson, and 
Mitchell (1998) ascribed this ability to four-year-olds, although the precise age is not relevant here. 
Many people have taken the Harris and Riggs findings as evidence that by 4 years, children have 
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achieved a milestone development: counterfactual thinking. However, recent evidence suggests that 
the abilities of these preschool children do not reflect adult-like counterfactual thinking. 
One important subsequent development is that children come to relate the imagined 
counterfactual world to what they know to be true. For adults this relating distinguishes counterfactual 
thinking from other types of speculation: I can daydream about winning the lottery without relating 
this to reality. But if I fail to buy a ticket one week and ‘my’ numbers come up there’s an all too 
salient relationship between the real and counterfactual world. Beck and colleagues (2006) showed 
that questions requiring simultaneously acknowledging both what happened and what could have 
happened were more difficult than the Harris and Riggs counterfactual conditional questions.  In 
Beck’s task a mouse took one of two paths finishing up at the end of it. Three- to six-year-olds found 
it relatively difficult to answer the question “Could he have gone anywhere else?” i.e., to acknowledge 
that there were two possible ways the world could have turned out.  
When we consider what ‘almost happened’, we also think about two possible worlds. For 
example, describing that a horse ‘almost fell’ draws one’s attention to the fact that it did not fall 
(reality) yet could have (counterfactual). Beck and Guthrie (2011) showed that it is not until children 
are 5 years old that they make this counterfactual interpretation of ‘almost’ reliably (Harris (1997) 
suggested that 2½-year-olds could do this, but the recent study suggests these were false positives).  
Work by Perner and colleagues also emphasises the importance of the relationship between 
the counterfactual and real world. They found a difference in difficulty when children had to take 
what happened in to account to generate the counterfactual compared to when they could ignore what 
had gone before. Both 3- and 4-year-olds (Perner, Sprung, & Steinkogler, 2004) and 5- to 6-year-olds 
(Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010) found the former much more difficult to answer correctly 
than the latter.  
While we include Perner’s studies as evidence for further counterfactual thinking development 
into middle childhood, Perner and colleagues hold a rather different position. They conclude that 
younger children answer counterfactual questions using basic conditional reasoning: they base their 
answer on general knowledge, not counterfactual thinking. For example, in their recent study children 
heard scenarios based on the Harris, German and Mills (1996) study where Carol and John make dirty 
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footprints on a floor. Children performed worse when they had to judge that the floor would still be 
dirty if (only) Carol had removed her shoes, than when only one person was involved (Rafetseder, 
Hofer, Ecker, & Perner, 2012). Perner and colleagues argue that we must wait until early adolescence 
for evidence of genuine counterfactual reasoning - their focus is on a late single development.  
COUNTERFACTUAL EMOTIONS. 
Further evidence that counterfactual thinking develops beyond the preschool years comes 
from research on children’s counterfactual emotions, in particular regret and relief - although there are 
other counterfactual emotions including shame and guilt (Landman, 1993). We experience regret 
when our actions give rise to a reality that is worse than it could have been, for example, when a 
student stays out late the night before an exam that she fails. Relief is the complement to this, where 
reality is better than it could have been (n.b., Sweeney & Vohs (2012) consider this ‘near-miss relief’) 
Studies of children’s experience of counterfactual emotions typically involve children making 
a simple choice between two boxes and receiving the reward contained within their chosen one. Then 
they learn what was in the unchosen box: a better prize in regret trials (e.g., 8 stickers compared to 2), 
or a worse prize in relief trials (e.g., 0 stickers compared to 2). Children are judged to feel regret if 
they rate themselves as less happy on learning what was in the unchosen box compared to how they 
felt before learning (e.g. Weisberg & Beck, 2010). Relief is shown when children rate themselves as 
more happy. There has been some discussion in this fledgling literature as to whether these tasks 
really measure counterfactual emotions or only a reality-based emotion, such as frustration that the 
better prize eludes them. Supportive evidence that these are genuine counterfactual emotions comes 
from the observation that children are less likely to rate themselves as less happy if ‘their box’ was 
determined by overt chance (the throw of a die) rather than their own choice (Weisberg & Beck, 
2012). It is not yet clear from the literature when children first experience counterfactual emotions. 
Weisberg & Beck (2010; 2012) find some evidence that 4- and 5-year-olds experience regret, 
O’Connor, McCormack, & Feeney (2011) report regret in 6-year-olds but not younger children, and 
Rafetseder and Perner (2012) argue that regret is not experienced until around 10 years. There is a 
delay between experiencing counterfactual emotions and attributing them to others (Weisberg & 
Beck, 2010; see also Guttentag & Ferrell, 2004). Although there is little evidence, there is a hint that 
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experiencing and understanding relief lags behind regret, at least in some contexts (Guttentag & 
Ferrell, 2004; Weisberg & Beck, 2012). 
Adults experience counterfactual emotions when they reflect on what could have happened in 
the past, but the relationship between counterfactuals and reality is even more complicated by the fact 
that they also anticipate counterfactual emotions (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). For example, I might 
avoid a novel ‘dish if the day’ in my favourite restaurant, opting instead for my trusted staple, because 
I know I will regret the risky choice if it turns out to be disappointing. Although there is very limited 
developmental evidence on this faculty, it should come as no surprise that anticipated regret, with its 
associated demands in thinking about multiple possible futures, is later developing than counterfactual 
thinking in the present (Guttentag & Ferrell, 2009). 
To sum up so far: A single early development does not give rise to adult-like counterfactual 
thinking. Consistent with this view, Perner claims that counterfactual thinking is a late emerging 
developmental phenomenon. While we agree that fully fledged adult-like counterfactual thinking may 
appear late, we think it is a mistake to ignore earlier developments along the way, including i) relating 
the real and counterfactual world and ii) making comparisons between them that result in 
counterfactual emotions. We argue that these are critical developments in counterfactual thinking and 
in what follows we consider further evidence why: each is underpinned by changes in domain general 
processing. 
DOMAIN GENERAL INFLUENCES ON COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING. 
Counterfactual thinking draws on a variety of domain general cognitive processes, although 
some also claim a role for domain specific knowledge (Sobel, 2011). There is evidence from 
individual differences studies that the executive processes working memory - the ability to hold 
information in mind relevant to a task goal (Guajardo, Parker, & Turley-Ames, 2009) and inhibition - 
the ability to ignore interfering cognitions that are irrelevant to a task goal (Beck, Riggs, & Gorniak, 
2009) underpin counterfactual thinking. 
That executive processes relate to counterfactual thinking is perhaps not surprising. To 
speculate about what might have been, one needs to put aside what one knows to be true (inhibition) 
and hold both the counterfactual and real worlds in mind (working memory). Counterfactual emotions 
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require making a comparison between the real and imagined and in line with this, experience of regret 
is predicted by children’s attentional flexibility – the ability to switch between mental set (Burns, 
Riggs, & Beck, 2012).  
Children’s language ability also contributes to their counterfactual thinking competence (e.g., 
Beck et al., 2009). This leads to the interesting possibility that language is necessary for 
counterfactual thought and the consequent speculation that counterfactual thinking might be a 
uniquely human ability. There is evidence that rhesus monkeys represent hypothetical outcomes of 
unchosen behaviours (e.g., Abe & Lee, 2011), but whether this is evidence of counterfactual thought 
is uncertain. Indeed, it is difficult to know what non-verbal behavior would provide convincing 
evidence of counterfactual thinking.  
Domain general processes are clearly important in the development of counterfactual thinking, 
and key advances in this processing allow children to develop more sophisticated counterfactual 
thinking. What though of this relationship in adults? To some extent adult counterfactual thinking 
must continue to place demands on executive function and language, but it is unknown whether these 
processes remain necessary or limiting. Do adults tax their inhibition in order to speculate about what 
might have been, or is this demand trivial for them?  Indeed, is adult counterfactual thought automatic 
and effortless (Goldinger, Kleider, Azuma, & Beike, 2003)? Another possibility is that executive 
processes may allow adults to strategically control how they manage counterfactual thoughts (e.g., 
they may use inhibitory control to avoid dwelling on unpleasant events).  
FUTURE WORK 
Our theoretical view of multiple developments underpinned by domain general processes 
provides a rich account of children’s counterfactual thinking. It also informs other research in 
cognitive development where an understanding of counterfactual thinking is deemed important, such 
as causal understanding (Frosch, McCormack, Lagnado, & Burns, 2012) and decision-making 
(O’Connor, Feeney, & McCormack, 2012). Furthermore, the multiple developments account offers a 
framework for thinking about the complexities of counterfactual thinking to inform neuroscience and 
adult cognitive and social research. There is much to be gained by seeing counterfactual thinking as 
relying on numerous processes and developments rather than being unitary: different brain areas are 
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likely to be implicated in hitherto neglected processes and a better understanding of those areas 
already implicated (e.g., the orbito-frontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex and hippocampus) can be 
gained by investigating their specific processing demands. 
Adults spontaneously engage in counterfactual thinking, but it is unknown at what age and 
under which circumstances children do so. We have some preliminary ideas based on children’s 
understanding of ‘almost’ and their experience of regret, but in these studies children are prompted to 
engage in counterfactual thought by the experimental set-up. We know children can talk about 
hypothetical worlds (e.g. Kucjaz & Daly, 1979) from 4 years, but when do they make spontaneous 
counterfactual speculations of the type that play on the minds of adults? Do children spontaneously 
generate their own counterfactuals as soon as they have the reasoning competence? When does 
counterfactual thinking become automatic? Once children spontaneously generate counterfactuals, do 
they necessarily experience counterfactual emotions or is even more development needed? Answering 
these questions is critical for understanding how this reasoning is employed in the real world. 
Adults’ counterfactual thinking is susceptible to various biases. They engage in more 
counterfactual thinking when people act rather than fail to act, or when counterfactual worlds seemed 
close rather than distant (e.g., I almost caught the plane or I missed it by 2 hours). Some researchers 
have begun to investigate these biases in children (Meehan & Byrne, 2005; Weisberg & Beck, 2012), 
but we have yet to understand the origins of these biases. A developmental perspective offers a unique 
opportunity to understand how biases appear: do they result from intrinsic differences in how we 
process counterfactuals, or are they learned?  
Recent research suggests that counterfactual thinking is implicated in a diversity of clinical 
populations including: schizophrenia (Roese et al., 2008), depression (Markman & Miller, 2006), and 
autism (Beeger, Terwogt, Lunenburg, & Stegge, 2009). If there are multiple developments in 
counterfactual thinking, underpinned by different executive processes, there is a need to explore 
possibly subtle differences in counterfactual thinking in these disorders.  
In sum, developmental psychology offers insight in to the fact that counterfactual thinking is a 
complex ability with a protracted development over early and middle childhood, supported by a 
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number of domain general cognitive processes. By neglecting these complexities researchers in a 
diversity of fields are at risk over oversimplification.  
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Recommended Readings: 
Beck, S.R., Riggs, K.J., & Burns, P.L. (2011) Multiple developments in counterfactual 
thinking. In Understanding Counterfactuals/Understanding Causality. C. Hoerl, T. 
McCormack, S.R. Beck (eds.) OUP: Oxford, UK.  
 This paper gives a detailed review of the developmental studies that suggest that 
several developments take place in children’s counterfactual thinking. 
Harris, P.L. (2000). The Work of the Imagination. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 This book situates children’s counterfactual thinking within the broader literatures on 
pretence, hypothetical thinking and complex emotions. 
Rafetseder, E., & Perner, J. (2012). When the alternative would have been better: 
Counterfactual reasoning and the emergence of regret. Cognition and Emotion, 26,  
800-819. 
Weisberg, D.P. & Beck, S.R. (2012). The development of children’s regret and relief. 
Cognition and Emotion, 26, 820-835. 
 These two papers in the same issue of Cognition and Emotion represent the state-of-the-
art of research on children’s counterfactual emotions and illustrate the ongoing debate. 
  
What might have been             15 
 
Endnotes 
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